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ABSTRACT 
In 1998 [8], Patarin proposed an efficient cryptosystem called Little Dragon which was a variant a 
variant of Matsumoto Imai cryptosystem C*. However Patarin latter found that Little Dragon 
cryptosystem is not secure [8], [3]. In this paper we propose a cryptosystem Little Dragon Two which is 
as efficient as Little Dragon cryptosystem but secure against all the known attacks. Like Little Dragon 
cryptosystem the public key of Little Dragon Two is mixed type that is quadratic in plaintext and cipher 
text variables. So the public key size of Little Dragon Two is equal to Little Dragon Cryptosystem. Our 
public key algorithm is bijective and can be used for both encryption and signatures.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public key cryptography has several practical applications, for example in e-commerce systems 
for authentication (electronic signatures) and for secure communication. The most widely used 
cryptosystems RSA and ECC (elliptic curve cryptosystems) are based on the problems of 
integer factorisation and discrete logarithm respectively. Integer factorisation and discrete 
logarithm problems are only believed to be hard but no proof is known for their NP-
completeness or NP-hardness. Improvements in factorisation algorithms and computation power 
demand larger bit size in RSA key which makes RSA less efficient for practical applications. 
Although RSA and ECC have some drawbacks, they are still not broken. But in 1999 [1] Peter 
Shor discovered the polynomial time algorithm for integer factorization and computation of 
discrete logarithm on quantum computers. Thus once we have quantum computers in the range 
of 1,000 bits, the cryptosystems based on these problems can no longer be considered secure. 
So, there is a strong motivation to develop public key cryptosystems based on problems which 
are secure on both conventional and quantum computers. Multivariate cryptography is based on 
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the problem of solving nonlinear system of equations over finite fields which is proven to be 
NP-complete. Quantum computers do not seem to have any advantage on solving NP-complete 
problems, so multivariate cryptography can be a viable option applicable to both conventional 
and quantum computers. MIC*, the first practical public key cryptosystem based on this 
problem was proposed in 1988 [5] by T. Matsumoto and H. Imai. The MIC* cryptosystem was 
based on the idea of hiding a monomial  by two invertible affine transformations. This 
cryptosystem was more efficient than RSA and ECC. Unfortunately this cryptosystem was 
broken by Patarin in 1995[6]. In 1996 [7] Patarin gave a generalisation of MIC* cryptosystem 
called HFE, however in HFE the secret key computation was not as efficient as in the original 
MIC* Cryptosystem. The basic instance of HFE was broken in 1999[9]. The attack uses a 
simple fact that every homogeneous quadratic multivariate polynomial has a matrix 
representation. Using this representation a highly over defined system of equations can be 
obtained which can be solved by a new technique called relinearization [9].  Patarin [8] 
investigated whether it is possible to repair MIC* with the same kind of easy secret key 
computations. He designed some cryptosystems known as Little Dragon and Big Dragon with 
multivariate polynomials of total degree 2 and 3 respectively in plaintext and cipher text 
variables in public key with efficiency comparable to MIC*. Due to its efficiency and quadratic 
public key size, the Little Dragon Scheme was more interesting, however Patarin found [8], [3] 
that Little Dragon Scheme is insecure. Some more multivariate public key cryptosystems can be 
found in reference [11] and [12]. For a brief introduction of multivariate cryptography we refer 
to the interested readers to reference [13]. An interesting introduction of hidden monomial 
cryptosystems can be found in reference [3]. 
Designing secure and efficient multivariate public key cryptosystems continues to be a 
challenging area of research in recent years. In this paper we present Little Dragon Two, a 
modified and secure version of Little Dragon cryptosystem. Like Dragon cryptosystems the 
public key in our cryptosystem is of mixed type but of degree two in plaintext and cipher text 
variables. The efficiency of our public key cryptosystem is equivalent to that of Little Dragon 
cryptosystem. The complexity of encryption or signature verification is equivalent to other 
multivariate public key cryptosystems that is O(n3) where n is the bit size. In decryption or in 
signature generation we need only one exponentiation in finite field 
2nF  and this result in much 
faster decryption and signature generation. The outline of our paper is as follows. In section 2 
we present our cryptosystem and in section 3 we give the security analysis of our cryptosystem. 
In section 4 we discuss its efficiency. 
2. THE CRYPTOSYSTEM LITTLE DRAGON TWO 
Let p  be a prime, n  be a positive integer, and qF  be the Galois field of q  = 
np  elements. A 
polynomial ( )f x  in qF [x] is said to be a permutation polynomial, if it is a polynomial function 
of qF  onto qF . A polynomial qf ∈ F [x] is a permutation polynomial of qF  if and only if one of 
the following conditions holds: 
The function is f  onto; 
The function is f  one to-one; 
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( )f x
 = a has a solution in qF  for each a ∈ qF ; 
( )f x  = a has a unique solution in qF   for each a ∈ qF
  
Lemma 2.1[2] 
1. Every linear polynomial that is a polynomial of the form ax b+ with 0a ≠  over qF   is a 
permutation polynomial of qF . 
 2. The monomial nx  is a permutation polynomial of qF  if and only if gcd ( n , 1q − ) =1 
Lemma 2.2 The polynomial f(x) = 2 2 2 2r r rr k kx x x+ + + , where r  and k  are positive integers, 
is a permutation polynomial of 
2nF  if and only if 
22 2
r k r+  and 2 1n −  are co – prime. 
Proof.  First note that there exist integers r and k such that 22 2
r k r+ and 2 1n − are co - prime. 
It is known that composition of two permutation polynomials is a permutation polynomial, see 
chapter 7 of [2]. It is easy to check that f (x +1) = 2 2 1r rkx + + . By lemma 2.1, ( 1)f x +  is a 
permutation polynomial if and only if 22 2
r k r+  and 2 1n − are co-prime.           ■ 
We use ( )Tr x  to denote the trace function from finite field, 2nF to 2F  i.e., 
   
2 12 2 2( ) ........... mTr x x x x x −= + + + +  
As a consequence of above lemmas we can deduce the following lemma, which we will use to 
design our public key cryptosystem. 
Lemma 2.3 The polynomials 2 2( ) ( )r rk lg x x x xα= + + +  is permutation polynomial of 2nF , 
where ( ) 1Tr α =  and 2.(2 2 ) 1mod 2 1r k r nl + = −  
Proof. First note that
22 2( ) ( ) 1k r
r
Tr x x Trα α+ + = = , so 
22 2 0
k rr
x x α+ + ≠  for all 
2nx ∈ F . Let β  be an element of a finite field 2nF . Consider the equation, ( )g x β= , that is, 
     
22 2( )k r l
r
x x xα β+ + + =  
It is clearly equivalent to 
                                              ( )2 .2 2k rrx x xα β+ + = +  
Raising both sides the power 2 .2 2
r k r+ , we get, 
   ( ) ( )2 22 22 2r k rk r rx x xα β ++ + = +  
Or, 
   ( ) ( )2 22 22 2 0k rk r rrx x xα β ++ + + + =  
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Suppose ( ) ( ) ( ) 22 2 22 2 k rk r rrh x x x xα β += + + + + . We have to show that for any 2nδ ∈ F  the 
equation ( ) 0h x =  has a unique solution. Note that ( ) 0h x =  and ( ) 0h x β+ =  have the same 
number of solutions. Now ( ) 0h x β+ = is equivalent to, 
   
2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 0
k r k r k rr r r
x x x β β α+ + + + + + =
 
Note that by lemma 2.2 
2 22 2 2 2k r k r
r r
x x x+ + + is a permutation polynomial of 2nF . Hence the 
equation ( ) 0h x β+ =  has a unique solution for any n2β ∈ F .                   ■ 
2.1. Public key generation 
For the public key cryptosystem we cannot take all the permutation polynomials of the 
form ( )22 2 lk rrx x xα+ + + , because we want public key size to be quadratic. But the 
permutation polynomials in which l  is of the form 2 1t +  or 2 1t −  can be used to design the 
multivariate public key cryptosystem with quadratic public key size. For l is of the form 2 1t + it 
is not clear whether ( )g x  is permutation polynomial or not. But for r = 0, n = 2m – 1, k = m 
and 2 1ml = − , g(x) is permutation polynomial because in this case 22 2 2 1r mk r+ = +  
and (2 1)(2 1) 1mod 2 1m m n− + = − . So for public key generation we will take 
( )g x = ( )2 12 mmx x xα −+ + + , where α  is secret. We can take other suitable values ,r k and n  
such that l is of the form 2 2i j− . There are few choices for r , k  and l  so we can assume that 
these are known. Suppose s  and t  are two invertible affine transformations. The relation 
between the plaintext and the cipher text is ( ( )) ( )g s x t y= , where x variable denotes the 
plaintext and y , the cipher text. Suppose ( )s x u=  and ( )t y v= . Thus we have the following 
relation between plaintext and cipher text: ( )2 12 mmu u u vα −+ + + =  
or ( ) ( )22 0mmu u u vα+ + + + = , this relation can be written as: 
   
2 1 2 2 2 0
m m m m
u u v uv u u vα α α+ + + + + + + =           (1) 
Suppose 1 2{ , ,........... }nB β β β=  is a basis of 2nF over 2F . Any n2x ∈ F can be expressed 
as ∑
−
=
=
1
1
n
i ii
xx β , where 2x ∈ F .Thus n2F can be identified by n2F , the set of all n  tuples 
over 2F . Substituting ( )u s x=  and ( )v t y= , where 1 2( , ,......., )nx x x x=  
and 1 2( , ,........, )ny y y y= , we get the n quadratic polynomial equations of the form 
   
0ij i j ij i j k k k k la x x b x y c y d x e+ + + + =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
  (2) 
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Here the coefficients 2, , , ,ij ij k k la b c d e ∈ F . Note that 
2 1m
u
+ gives the terms of the 
form 1cxxx kji ++∑∑ , where 1c  is constant and 2
m
u v uv+  gives the terms of the 
form 2i j k lx y x y c+ + +∑ ∑ ∑ , 2
m
u uα + gives the terms of the form 3cxi +∑  and vα  
gives the terms of the form 4cyi +∑ . So, n  polynomial equations of the form (2) represent the 
required public key. 
2.2. Secret Key 
The invertible affine transformations ( , )s t  and finite field element α  are secret keys. 
2.3. Encryption  
If Bob wants to send a plaintext message 1 2,( , ......., )nx x x x=  to Alice, he does the following: 
1. Bob substitutes the plaintext 1 2( , ,......., )nx x x  in public key and gets n  linear equations in 
cipher text variables 1 2, ,........, ny y y . 
2. Second step of encryption is to solve these linear equations by Gaussian elimination method 
to get the cipher text 1 2( , ,........, )ny y y y= . 
2.4. Decryption  
Here we describe the decryption algorithm. 
Input: Cipher text and 1 2( , ,........, )ny y y y=  secret parameters ( , , )s t α . 
Output: Message 1 2( , ,......., )nx x x  
1: 1 2( , ,........, )nv t y y y←  
2: 
2
1 1
m
z v vα← + + +
 
3: 2 12 1
m
z z −← , 3 21z v z← + +  
4: 11 ( 1)X s v−← +  and 12 3( )X s z−←  
5: Return 1 2( , )X X .           
Either 1X  or 2X is the required secret message. There are only two choices for message so it is 
easy to identify the correct message. 
Proof. We prove that the procedure described above output a valid plaintext. The relation 
between plaintext and cipher text is 2 2 1( )m mu u u vα −+ + + = or 
equivalently 2 2 1( )m mu u u vα ++ + = + , which can be converted into the 
form 2 1 2( 1) 1 0m mu v v v α++ + + + + + = . There are only two possibilities either 1u v= +  
or 1u v≠ + . If 1u v= + then, 1( 1)x s v−= + . If 1u v≠ + then raising both sides power 
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2 1m − in the relation 2 1 2( 1) 1m mu v v v α++ + = + + + , we get 2 2 11 ( 1)m mu v v v α −+ + = + + +  
or 21 ( 1)mu v v v α= + + + + + which implies 1 2( 1 ( 1))mx s v v v α−= + + + + +                      ■ 
Example 2.1 Here is the toy example four our cryptosystem. We are taking the finite field 
32
F that is m = 2 and n = 3. The polynomial x3 + x + 1 is irreducible over F2. Suppose γ is the 
root of this polynomial in the extension field of
2F , i.e., γ
3
 + γ + 1 = 0. Using the basis {1, γ, γ2} 
the finite field 32F can be expressed as 32F = {0, 1, γ, γ
2
, 1 + γ, γ + γ2, 1 + γ + γ2}. We are taking 
α = 1 + γ + γ2, as Tr (1 + γ + γ2=) ≠  0, s(x) = A1x + c1 and t(x) = A2x + c2 are two invertible 
affine transformations, where 










=
100
110
011
1A and 










=
100
110
111
2A  c1 = (1, 0, 1)T and c2 = (0, 
1, 0)T. Suppose 32x ∈ F , then x can be expressed as x = x1 + x2γ + x3γ
2
 or equivalently x = (x1, 
x2, x3), where 2i Fx ∈ .Taking x = (x1, x2, x3), we have A1x + c1 = (x1 + x2 + 1, x2 + x3, x3 + 1) 
and A2x + c2 = (x1 + x2 + x3, x2 + x3, x3). For the plaintext variable x = (x1, x2, x3), the 
corresponding cipher text variable is y = (y1, y2, y3). We have u = (x1 + x2 + 1) + (x2 + x3) γ + (x3 
+ 1) γ2 and v = (y1 + y2 + y3) + (y2 + y3 + 1) γ + y3γ2. The relation between plaintext and cipher 
text is 2 1 2 2 2 0
m m m m
u u v uv u u vα α α+ + + + + + + = . Substituting u and v and α = 1 + γ + γ2, 
we have the following relation between plaintext and cipher text (x2x3 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y3 + x1 
+ x2 + y1 + y2 + y3) + (x3x1 + x2x3 + x3y1 + x3y2 + x2y2 + x2 + x3 + y2 + y3 + 1) γ + (x2x1 + x2y1 + 
x2y2 + x3y2 + x3y3 + x2 + y3 + 1) γ2 = 0 or equivalently we have 
x2x3 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y3 + x1 + x2 + y1 + y2 + y3 = 0 
 
x3x1 + x2x3 + x3y1 + x3y2 + x2y2 + x2 + x3 + y2 + y3 + 1 = 0 
 
x2x1 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x3y2 + x3y3 + x2 + y3 + 1 = 0 
Above equations represent the required public key. Note that the above equations are non- linear 
in plaintext variable (x1, x2, x3) and linear in cipher text variables (y1, y2, y3).        
3. THE SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM 
In this section we discuss the security of the proposed cryptosystem. In general it is very 
difficult to prove the security of a public key cryptosystem. For example if the public modulus 
of RSA is decomposed into its prime factors then the RSA is broken. However it is not proved 
that breaking RSA is equivalent to factoring its modulus. In this section we will give some 
security arguments and evidence that our cryptosystem is secure. We are using the polynomial   
( )2 12 mmx x xα −+ + + , where α  is secret. Thus if we write this polynomial in the form 
0
i d
i
i
i
xδ
=
=
∑ then some coefficients will be 0 and 1 and some coefficients will be function ofα . 
Since α  is secret so most of the coefficients of this polynomial are also secret. One important 
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point is that the degree d  of this polynomial is not constant but it is function of n as m = (n + 
1)/2. It is easy to see that Linearization Equation attack of [6] is not applicable to our 
cryptosystem. The Coppersmith–Patarin attack on Little Dragon cryptosystem [3] is due to the 
using monomial nx   to design the little dragon cryptosystem so this attack is also not applicable 
to our cryptosystem. The attacks discussed in this section are Gröbner basis, univariate 
polynomial representation, and Differential cryptanalysis, and Relinearization, XL and FXL 
algorithms. 
3.1. Attacks with Differential Cryptanalysis 
Differential cryptanalysis has been successfully used earlier to attack the symmetric 
cryptosystem. In recent years differential cryptanalysis has emerged as a powerful tool to attack 
the multivariate public key cryptosystems too. In 2005 [14] Fouque, Granboulan and Stern used 
differential cryptanalysis to attack the multivariate cryptosystems. The key point of this attack is 
that in case of quadratic polynomials the differential of public key is a linear map and its kernel 
or its rank can be analysed to get some information on the secret key. For any multivariate 
quadratic function G: nqF
m
q→ F    the differential operator between any two points ,
n
qx k ∈ F  
can be expressed as L G,k = G(x+k) – G(x) – G(k) + G(0)  and in fact that operator is a bilinear 
function. By knowing the public key of a given multivariate quadratic scheme and by knowing 
the information about the nonlinear part  1( )iqx +  they showed that for certain parameters it is 
possible to recover the kernel of  L G,k. This attack was successfully applied on MIC* 
cryptosystem and afterwards using the same technique Dubois, Fouque, Shamir and Sterm in 
2007[16] have completely broken all versions of the SFLASH signature scheme proposed by 
Patarin, Courtois, and Goubin [15]. In our cryptosystem instead of using monomial of the form , 
1( )iqx + we are using the polynomial 2 2 1( )m mx x xα −+ + + . Clearly the degree of this 
polynomial is not quadratic. Moreover the public key in our cryptosystem is of mixed type. 
Substituting the cipher text gives quadratic plaintext variables but in that case it will be different 
for different cipher texts. So to attack our cryptosystem by the methods of [14] and [16] is not 
feasible. 
3.2. Univariate polynomial representation of Multivariate Public Polynomials  
In our cryptosystem the encryption function is 1( ( ( )))y t f s x−= , 
where 2 2 1( ) ( )m mf x x x xα −= + + + . Suppose d is the degree of polynomial ( )f x . Then 
( )f x will give multivariate polynomials of degree w(d), where w(d) denotes the hamming 
weight of d. As the composition with affine transformations will not affect the degree of 
multivariate polynomials, so 1( ( ( )))t f s x−   will also give multivariate polynomials of degree 
w(d). Note that the degree d is not constant but it is function of n. It is easy to see that the 
degree of univariate polynomial representation of encryption function is not constant but it is 
function of n. By lemma 3.3 of [9] the degree and the number of nonzero terms of the univariate 
polynomial representation of encryption function are both O(nn). The complexity of root finding 
algorithms e.g Berlekamp algorithm, is polynomial in the degree of the polynomial. This results 
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in an exponential time logarithm to find the roots of univariate polynomial. Therefore this line 
of attack is less efficient than the exhaustive search.  
3.3. Gröbner Basis Attacks 
After substituting the cipher text in public key one can get n quadratic equations in n variables 
and then Gröbner basis techniques can be applied to solve the system. The classical algorithm 
for solving a system of multivariate systems is Buchberger’s algorithm [4]. Although it can 
solve all the multivariate quadratic equations in theory its complexity is exponential in the 
number of variables. We remark that there is no closed form- formula for its complexity. In the 
worst case the Buchberger’s algorithm is known to run in double exponential time and on 
average its running time seems to be single exponential (see [17]). There are some efficient 
variants F4 and F5 of Buchberger’s algorithm given by Jean-Charles Faugere (see [19] and [20]). 
The complexity of computing a Gröbner basis by Buchberger’s algorithm for the public 
polynomials of the basic HFE scheme is too high to be feasible. However it is completely 
feasible using the algorithm F5. The complexities of solving the public polynomials of several 
instances of the HFE using the algorithm F5 are provided in [10]. Moreover it has been 
expressed in [10] “a crucial point in the cryptanalysis of HFE is the ability to distinguish a 
randomly algebraic system from an algebraic system coming from HFE”. Moreover our public 
key is of mixed type, this mean for different cipher texts we will get different system of 
quadratic polynomial equations, so in our public key the quadratic polynomials looks random. 
We are using a polynomial which has degree proportional to n. It is explained in [10] that in this 
case there does not seem to exist polynomial time algorithm to compute the Gröbner basis. 
Hence to attack our cryptosystem by Gröbner basis method is not feasible. 
3.4. Relinearization, XL and FXL Algorithms 
Relinearization, XL or FXL algorithms [9], [17] are the techniques to solve the over defined 
system of equations i.e., ε n2 equations in n variables, where ε ≥ 0. To attack the HFE 
cryptosystem, first the equivalent quadratic polynomial representation of HFE public key was 
obtained and then using the matrix representation of quadratic polynomials, they obtained O(n2) 
polynomial equations in O(n) variables [9]. The Relinearization and XL or FXL techniques are 
used to solve this system of equations. Note that our polynomial is not quadratic, moreover the 
degree of our polynomial is not constant but it is function of n, so the attack of [9] is not feasible 
to our cryptosystem. Adversary cannot use directly Relinearization, XL or FXL algorithms to 
attack our cryptosystem because when number of equations are equal to number of variables, 
the complexities of these algorithms is 2n. 
4. EFFICIENCY OF THE PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM 
In this section we give complexity of the encryption and decryption of our cryptosystem. 
4.1. Encryption  
The public key in our cryptosystem consists of n equations of the form (2). There are O(n2) 
terms of the form xixj in each n equations of the public key so the complexity of evaluating 
public key at message block  1 2( , ,......., )nx x x  is O(n3). The next step of encryption is to solve 
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the n linear equation in n cipher text variables yo, y1,...,yn. This can be done efficiently by 
Gaussian elimination in O(n3) complexity. Hence the total complexity of encryption is O(n3).       
4.2. Decryption 
In the decryption of the proposed cryptosystem we need only one exponentiation namely 
2 1
2 1
m
z z −←  . So the complexity of decryption is equivalent to Little- Dragon cryptosystem [3], 
[8]. Note that for exponentiation in finite fields 
2nF  there are several efficient algorithms, so the 
exponentiation can be performed very efficiently. The exact complexity of exponentiation will 
depend on the algorithm used. 
5. CONCLUSION  
We have designed an efficient multivariate public key cryptosystem. Like Little Dragon 
Cryptosystem the public key is mixed type but quadratic. Efficiency of our cryptosystem is 
equivalent to Little Dragon Cryptosystem. We have analysed our cryptosystem against all the 
known attacks and showed that our cryptosystem is secure. 
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